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MISCELLANEA
THE PUBLICATION OF CICERO’S PRO ROSCIO AMERINO
The Catilinarians and Pro Milone demonstrate that Cicero was prepared
on occasion to make changes to his speeches, in the light of changed cir-
cumstances, when he came to write them up for publication. The Catilinarians
were delivered in 63 BC but written up and sent to Atticus only in 60
(Att. 2.1.3), and it is clear that the pervasive element of apologia in the
speeches re ects the climate of 60, when Cicero was being criticised by
P. Clodius for the executions of the captured conspirators, rather than that
of the original time of delivery, when the executions had not yet taken
place.1) Pro Milone, on the other hand, was delivered in an original form
at the trial of Milo in April 52 BC, but then, on the evidence of Asconius
(41-2 C), Dio (40.54.2-3) and the speech itself, revised and extended in
the light of subsequent trials in, perhaps, January 51.2) In this paper I
should like to consider whether anything similar has happened in the case
of Pro Roscio Amerino, a speech originally delivered under Sulla in 80 BC.
Let us begin with the background to the case. The speech is a defence
of Sex. Roscius of Ameria, accused by a hostile relation T. Roscius Magnus
(and the formal prosecutor, C. Erucius) of having arranged the murder of
his own father, also called Sex. Roscius, some months after the closing of
Sulla’s proscription lists on 1 June 81. After the murder, Magnus, together
with another relation T. Roscius Capito, formed a partnership with Sulla’s
powerful freedman L. Cornelius Chrysogonus, and Chrysogonus fraudu-
lently inserted the dead man’s name retrospectively into the lists of the
proscribed: instead of being inherited by his son, therefore, the dead man’s
property, consisting of thirteen farms with a total value of six million ses-
terces, was con scated and put up for auction. Chrysogonus then bought
it at a knock-down price, 2,000 sesterces, sharing it with his accomplices
Magnus and Capito afterwards. When the younger Sex. Roscius made
attempts to recover his inheritance, his enemies sought to remove him by
prosecuting him for his father’s murder. Roscius had powerful friends
among the nobility, but they declined to undertake his defence because
they were afraid of oVending Sulla; so the 26 year old Cicero took it on
as his  rst criminal case. The prosecutors seem to have supposed that fear
of Sulla would deter the defence from mentioning their purchase of the
dead man’s property, and hence their motive for bringing the charge; but
Cicero fearlessly exposed what they had done, and went on to win a
famous victory.
For Cicero, the chief diYculty in the case lay in its political sensitivity.
The proscriptions were over, but Sulla was still in power, and the case
was the  rst one to be heard in Sulla’s newly-established, permanent murder
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court. Moreover, the  gure behind the prosecution was Chrysogonus, a
henchman of Sulla’s who would be assumed to have his master’s support;
any criticism of Chrysogonus would therefore most naturally be interpreted
as a criticism of Sulla. This is why the Metelli, despite being Roscius’
patrons, declined to become involved: they gave Roscius material assis-
tance, but would not speak for him in court. For Cicero, the danger was
perhaps less because he was unknown and inconspicuous. But he was, on
the other hand, a distant relation of Marius, and an eques, and he needed
to tread with extreme care.
The strategy he adopted in his speech was to expose the partnership of
Magnus and Capito with Chrysogonus, revealing how they had purchased
the dead man’s property and were now seeking to destroy his son; with-
out taking this line, he had no hope of winning his case. But he actually
went further, accusing Magnus and Capito (but not Chrysogonus) of mur-
dering the elder Roscius themselves. He recognised, however, that in the
prevailing political climate any criticism of Sulla would be instantly fatal
to his case. As an essential part of his strategy, therefore, he took great
care to distinguish between Sulla and his minion, and attribute blame only
to the latter (Sulla is explicitly exculpated at §§ 21-2, 25-6, 110, 127 and
130-1). Condemnation of Chrysogonus, he stressed, did not in any way
imply criticism of Sulla.
The question whether Pro Roscio has been revised for publication hinges,
as we shall see, upon the attitude to Sulla and his régime which Cicero
espouses in the speech. It is not a new question. In 1925 Humbert pub-
lished his well-known monograph Les plaidoyers écrits et les plaidoiries réelles de
Cicéron in which he analysed a selection of speeches and argued, uncon-
vincingly, that they were amalgamations of separate speeches and passages
of altercation from diVerent points in the respective trials.3) In the case of
Pro Roscio, Humbert argued that the speech is an amalgamation of several
diVerent speeches, but he also made the interesting suggestion that the
speech or speeches which Cicero gave in court contained no hostile ref-
erences to Sulla, but that the published speech does so; and he explained
the diVerence between the two versions by supposing that Cicero revised
the speech when he returned from Greece after Sulla’s death, in 77. In
1975, however, Kinsey refuted most of Humbert’s arguments, showing that
the passages he selected did not support his conclusions; the idea that the
speech contains criticisms of Sulla was rejected (Kinsey, 1975). Kinsey con-
cluded that the speech as published was identical to the speech as deliv-
ered. Evidence of improvisation in the speech, Kinsey argued, showed that
Cicero did not prepare his speech beforehand and then simply publish
what he had prepared; instead, he improvised what was necessary, and
published exactly what he had said. For him to be able to do this, pub-
lication would have to have been immediate.
Kinsey’s article did not, however, take account of the view of Gabba,
Gruen and Harris.4) These scholars had argued (in historical works not
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primarily concerned with Pro Roscio) that Cicero does in fact make hostile
references to Sulla—although they are not, with one exception (§ 3), the
passages selected by Humbert—and that the speech was therefore likely
to have been revised for publication at a later date. After this, in 1975,
Buchheit went further and detected hostility to Sulla and his régime through-
out large sections of the speech.5) He did not go on to consider whether
this has any bearing on whether the speech was revised, or when it was
published; instead he assumed what Kinsey argued, that the published
speech is identical to the speech that was originally delivered.
In view of this lack of consensus, a re-examination of the question seems
in order. Rather than go through all the passages where hostility to Sulla
or later revision have been suspected, I should like to focus only on those
passages which seem to present the strongest case for a later revision: these
seem to me to be §§ 3, 21-2, 130-1 and 152-3. As far as the rest of the
speech is concerned, I should be happy to agree with Kinsey that there
is nothing that we can categorically assert could not have been delivered
at the trial.6)
A premise of my argument is that Cicero, like any competent advocate,
would not have allowed his own private views to lead him into saying
anything that would damage his case. Criticism of Sulla and his régime,
even if oblique, would unquestionably have been extremely damaging, as
would any suggestion of disrespect—a fact implicitly acknowledged by
Cicero in his references in the speech to Sulla, which are generally char-
acterised by the utmost respect and deference (e.g. §§ 6 de viro fortissimo et
clarissimo L. Sulla, quem honoris causa nomino; 127 nam Sullam et oratio mea ab
initio et ipsius eximia virtus omni tempore purgavit; 136; 146). Nevertheless, some
of the passages to which I now turn do appear to contain an element of
criticism and/or disrespect, while others, even more tellingly, do not relate
to the time and circumstances of Roscius’ trial.
First, then, § 3. Cicero is giving reasons why a young and inexperi-
enced speaker such as himself has stood up to defend Roscius, rather than
one of the distinguished nobles who have come to the court to support
him:
Ego si quid liberius dixero, vel occultum esse propterea quod nondum ad rem
publicam accessi, vel ignosci adulescentiae meae poterit; tametsi non modo ignoscendi
ratio verum etiam cognoscendi consuetudo iam de civitate sublata est.
The last clause, which I have italicised, comes as a very abrupt and
outspoken quali cation to what has preceded: Cicero says that in present-
day Rome not only is no one pardoned, but punishment is in icted with-
out due process of law. The remark is not necessary to his argument, and
in fact contradicts it, because his point is that he will indeed be pardoned.
More fundamentally, however, the remark is not appropriate to the period
of the trial, since that was of course held under due process of law: it was
the  rst case to be heard in Sulla’s new murder court (§ 11 longo intervallo
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iudicium inter sicarios hoc primum committitur). Instead, Cicero’s words must
relate to the period of lawlessness from 88 BC down to Sulla’s establish-
ment of the quaestiones in 81;7) this would include the Cinnanum tempus and,
most recently, the proscriptions of 82/1. It appears, then, that a disparaging
reference to the recent period of lawlessness—for which Sulla, as the author
of the proscriptions, was in part responsible—has been inserted, gratu-
itously and anachronistically, into the text of the speech. Kinsey (1975:
93) remarks that “it is understandable that someone of Cicero’s character
should have committed such an indiscretion at the time when the speech
was delivered”. But even if we allow that Cicero has made an error which
any competent advocate would surely have known to avoid, it is never-
theless impossible that he should have stated in a newly-established court
that no process of judicial enquiry existed at Rome. The passage, there-
fore, can only be a later addition, presumably intended to advertise Cicero’s
disapproval of the recent lawlessness, and in particular perhaps of Sulla’s
proscriptions.
Next, two passages which should be considered together, §§ 21-2 and
130-1. In the  rst one, Cicero has just explained how Chrysogonus fraud-
ulently added the elder Roscius’ name to the proscription lists and pur-
chased his property, and now he adds that Sulla knew nothing about this
(§§ 21-2):
Haec omnia, iudices, imprudente L. Sulla facta esse certo scio. Neque enim
mirum, cum eodem tempore et ea quae praeterita sunt <reparet> et ea quae
videntur instare praeparet, cum et pacis constituendae rationem et belli gerendi
potestatem solus habeat, cum omnes in unum spectent, unus omnia guber-
net, cum tot tantisque negotiis distentus sit ut respirare libere non possit, si
aliquid non animadvertat . . . Huc accedit quod, quamvis ille felix sit, sicut est,
tamen in tanta felicitate nemo potest esse in magna familia qui neminem
neque servum neque libertum improbum habeat.
Although ostensibly respectful towards Sulla, the passage makes the point
that he has a failing—inadvertence—and it does so in a slightly impudent
manner. First, there is a note of impertinent presumption in the way in
which the 26 year old Cicero expects the jury to take his word for it (certo
scio) that Sulla knew nothing: instead of simply asserting Sulla’s ignorance,
Cicero vouches for it on his own authority.8) Secondly, in the sentence
beginning Neque enim mirum, Sulla’s unique importance is emphasised in a
long sequence of clauses, but there is then perhaps a note of bathos in si
aliquid non animadvertat: Sulla does seem implicitly to be being accused of
not paying attention. Finally, the way in which Sulla’s famed felicitas is
quali ed in the last sentence is impertinent: Sulla is genuinely fortunate—
but not, however, as fortunate as he thinks. The greater directness of this
last reference serves to con rm a subversive reading of what has come
before. If Cicero were being more tactful, he would not have mentioned
Sulla’s felicitas at all. The topic seems to have been introduced purely in
order to give the whole passage a double-edged quality.
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In the third passage, which similarly seeks to exculpate Sulla (at least
on the surface), the irony is more pronounced (§ 131):
Placet igitur in his rebus aliquid imprudentia praeteriri? Non placet, iudices,
sed necesse est. Etenim si Iuppiter Optimus Maximus cuius nutu et arbitrio caelum
terra mariaque reguntur saepe ventis vehementioribus aut immoderatis tempestatibus aut nimio
calore aut intolerabili frigore hominibus nocuit, urbis delevit, fruges perdidit, quorum nihil
pernicii causa divino consilio sed vi ipsa et magnitudine rerum factum puta-
mus, at contra commoda quibus utimur lucemque qua fruimur spiritumque
quem ducimus ab eo nobis dari atque impertiri videmus, quid miramur,
iudices, L. Sullam, cum solus rem publicam regeret orbemque terrarum
gubernaret imperique maiestatem quam armis receperat iam legibus con rmaret,
aliqua animadvertere non potuisse?
Sulla’s inadvertence—or negligence—has once again become a topic for
Cicero to pronounce upon. A comparison of Sulla with Jupiter allows him
to pretend that he is treating him with deference—reverence, even; but
the comparison is damaging to Sulla, and draws our attention to the
destructiveness of his rule. Through the comparison (in the clauses which
I have italicised), Cicero points out that Sulla has not merely allowed
Chrysogonus to pro t: he has destroyed the cities of Italy and ruined
Italian agriculture. Kinsey detects no irony here (or in §§ 21-2); Kennedy
is uncertain.9) But if Cicero really wished not to be taken as hostile to
Sulla, he would have put the comparison in less provocative terms (for
example, by shortening the list of Jupiter’s acts of destruction) or, better,
would have omitted it altogether.10)
My  nal passage comes from the end of the speech, and is the most
puzzling; I have found no discussion of it. Cicero has been appealing to
the jury to save Roscius from Chrysogonus: their function should not be
to assist the purchasers of con scated property by condemning those who
have escaped their clutches. Then he continues (§§ 152-3):
An vero, iudices, vos non intellegitis nihil aliud agi nisi ut proscriptorum liberi
quavis ratione tollantur . . .? . . . Quod si . . . idcirco sedetis ut ad vos addu-
cantur eorum liberi quorum bona venierunt, cavete, per deos immortalis!
iudices, ne nova et multo crudelior per vos proscriptio instaurata esse videa-
tur. Illam priorem quae facta est in eos qui arma capere potuerunt tamen
senatus suscipere noluit, . . . hanc vero quae ad eorum liberos atque ad infantium
puerorum incunabula pertinet nisi hoc iudicio a vobis reicitis et aspernamini,
videte, per deos immortalis! quem in locum rem publicam perventuram putetis!
The prosecution of Roscius, Cicero says, is the beginning of a more
general attack on the children of the proscribed. The passage is undeni-
ably impressive in its use of rhetoric to move the jurors to pity (note espe-
cially infantium puerorum incunabula) and to increase the apparent signi cance
of the decision they are about to make. But all the same, I do not see
how Cicero could have used this argument in court since the fact that the
elder Roscius was not proscribed is the corner-stone of his defence, and
is something that he states again and again in his speech (§§ 21, 32, 125-
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6, 128, 130). If Roscius was proscribed, then his property was legally sold,
and Chrysogonus, Magnus and Capito have done nothing wrong. Cicero
could hardly have ended his speech with a point that contradicted his
entire line of defence, and the passage must surely therefore have been
added later, together with those parts of §§ 145-6 which anticipate it (if
§§ 152-3 are removed, the remaining text provides an eVective and logi-
cal conclusion to the speech; but of course we cannot know what the orig-
inal text of the conclusion was before Cicero altered it). §§ 152-3 were
most likely written at a time when the restoration of the property of the
children of the proscribed was a live issue, i.e. after Sulla’s death, and
Cicero wished to go on record as having supported their claims. Evidently,
at the time he added this passage to the speech, he was more concerned
to be seen as having supported the children of the proscribed than to have
made a logically coherent defence. A similar priority is in evidence at §
3: there a disparaging reference to the lawlessness of the period was inserted
even though it gave rise to anachronism. But since Cicero was known to
have won his case, perhaps such inconsistencies did not matter much.
They are certainly less glaring than the inconsistency at the heart of the
published Pro Milone. In that speech, Cicero felt free to base his published
defence on two mutually contradictory lines of argument; in the trial, on
the other hand, he had been forced to make a choice between the two
(and it was the defence that allowed the greater scope for emotional dis-
play that was sacri ced). (See note 2.)
The hypothesis that Cicero made alterations to Pro Roscio after Sulla’s
death would explain all the passages which I have examined. The criti-
cisms of Sulla and his régime would have damaged his chances of secur-
ing an acquittal, and so cannot have been included in the original speech:
they must be later additions. Their tone, for the most part, is one of irony:
Cicero could not aVord to make ironic remarks about Sulla in his origi-
nal speech, but they are appropriate to a later revision. The revision of
Pro Roscio would therefore resemble, to some extent, the revision of Pro
Milone, where ironic references to Pompey betray a re-writing of the speech
at a later point, something which in the case of that speech is supported
by external evidence. This is, in fact, only one of a number of resem-
blances between Cicero’s  rst and last defences in a criminal court.11)
Humbert would therefore appear to be right in supposing that Cicero
revised the speech when he returned from Greece after Sulla’s death, in
77. Kinsey, on the other hand, would be wrong to conclude that the
speech as published was identical to the speech as delivered (evidence of
improvisation, therefore, need not imply immediate publication). Cicero
tells us at Brutus 312 that after the success of his defence of Roscius he
was thought capable of taking on any case at all, and accepted a large
number of commissions. Among these was his successful defence of the
freedom of a woman from Arretium, politically a more signi cant case
than that of Roscius because it called into question, while Sulla was still
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alive, his disenfranchisement of entire communities (Caec. 97). The speech
was not published (to our knowledge): to have published it would have
been to court danger for no purpose. In 79 he went abroad for the sake
of his health, and studied under Molon of Rhodes (Brut. 313-6). When he
returned in 77, Sulla was dead. It would not be surprising if he took his
case notes with him to Asia, wrote up Pro Roscio, the most admired of the
speeches he had made (and perhaps approved or even improved by Molon),
and published it on his return to Rome.12) With Sulla dead, the criticisms
of him and the championing of the children of the proscribed would have
been suitable to the times, and his defence of the woman of Arretium
would have made his outspokenness appear in character.
At the end of his life Cicero spoke of his defence of Roscius in the fol-
lowing terms (OV. 2.51):
Maxime autem et gloria paritur et gratia defensionibus, eoque maior si quando
accidit ut ei subveniatur qui potentis alicuius opibus circumveniri urgerique
videatur, ut nos et saepe alias et adulescentes contra L. Sullae dominantis
opes pro Sex. Roscio Amerino fecimus; quae, ut scis, exstat oratio.
This is misleading because Pro Roscio was not contra L. Sullae dominantis
opes: it was against Chrysogonus, of whose misdeeds Cicero repeatedly
claimed that Sulla was ignorant. But the passage shows that Cicero wanted
it to be thought that he had a track record of resisting dictators. In his
revision of Pro Roscio at the outset of his career, we can see that he was
motivated by the same consideration.
University of Leeds D.H. Berry
d.h.berry@leeds.ac.uk
1) See Berry (1996: 54-5; also 54-9 on the issue of publication more generally).
2) See Stone (1980); Berry (1993); Berry (2000: 169-71).
3) Humbert (1925); cf. Clark (1927) (review); Stroh (1975: 31-54) (demolition).
Pro Roscio is discussed by Humbert (1925: 100-11).
4) Gabba (1964:10-1) (= Republican Rome, the Army and the Allies, tr. P.J. CuV
(Oxford 1976), 137-8); Gruen (1968: 268); Harris (1971: 271-3).
5) Buchheit (1975).
6) Although I would class parts of §§ 145-6 with my fourth passage, §§ 152-3.
7) Cf. Brut. 306 sublata iam esse in perpetuum ratio iudiciorum videbatur, referring to
88 BC.
8) Buchheit (1975: 580) suggests that imprudente in the  rst sentence may imply
foolishness as well as mere ignorance. But that sense of the word is rare in Cicero’s
speeches (TLL 7.1.703.50 V. cites only Deiot. 16).
9) Kinsey (1980: 175 n. 4); Kennedy (1972: 153-4).
10) Buchheit (1975: 588-9) makes a further point, that Cicero’s comparison of
Sulla to Jupiter and his description of Sulla’s power in quasi-regal terms (solus rem
publicam regeret, the only instance in Cicero of regere governing res publica) serve to
underline the tyranny of his rule. If one  rst accepts that the passage is hostile to
Sulla (because of the references to destruction), then this point may also be accepted;
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but I do not think that the comparison to Jupiter and the words solus . . . regeret by
themselves imply hostility.
11) See further Berry & Heath (1997: 396-406).
12) Of course, Pro Roscio is usually thought to be stylistically interesting because
it pre-dates Molon’s toning-down of Cicero’s style (Brut. 316; cf. Davies (1968));
this view might now require some quali cation.
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JUVENAL 10.84: A BRIEF NOTE
quam timeo, victus ne poenas exigat Aiax
ut male defensus. curramus praecipites et,
dum iacet in ripa, calcemus Caesaris hostem.
Nisbet suggested altering quam to non; Weidner suggested quam timeo victis,
ne . . ., though it is diYcult to see who ‘the conquered’ might be in this
context.
Courtney (1980) ad loc. rightly rejects all those interpretations which do
not identify Ajax with Tiberius; it is after all only Tiberius whom the
speaker and his friends have reason to fear. He continues: “DiYculty how-
ever remains; male defensus has no application to Ajax . . . and hardly seems
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